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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STEPHANIE C. CECIL, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JASON ALLEN CECIL, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
OPENING BRIEF 
Appellate Court No.: 20030937-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure because the entry of judgment on October 17, 2003 is considered to 
be the final decision of the trial court. Utah Code §78-2a-3(2)(e). The Notice of Appeal 
was filed on November 17, 2003. Thus, pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, this appeal is timely. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. The first issue is whether the trial court erred when it imposed the statutory 
guidelines for parent-time with the requirement that the noncustodial parent assume all 
financial costs associated with parent-time. [R. 82 at 201-206]. The standard of review is 
abuse of discretion. Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
B. The second issue is whether the trial court erred when it imputed the noncustodial 
parent's income. [R. 82 at 197-200]. The standard of review ic abuce of dioorotion. 
Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963, 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
C. The third issue is whether the trial court erred when it awarded the custodial parent 
alimony. [R. 82 at 209-211]. The standard of review is an abuse of discretion. Rehn v. 
Rehn, 974 P2d 306, 312 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
D. The fourth issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in awarding the custodial 
parent attorneys' fees. [R. 82 at 209]. The standard of review is an abuse of discretion. 
Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431,437 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 
442 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. CODES AND RULES 
Statutes1 
Utah Code § 30-3-5 
Utah Code § 30-3-32 
Utah Code § 30-3-33 
Utah Code § 30-3-34 
Utah Code § 30-3-37 
Utah Code § 78-45-7 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The nature of the case is a divorce action. [R. 1-2]. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below 
1. On 5/24/02, Stephanie Cecil filed for divorce. [R. 1-2]. 
2. On 7/11/02, Jason Cecil was served with the Summons and Complaint. [R. 7-8]. 
'All statutes set forth in this section are set forth in full in the Addendum 
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3. On 8/1/02, Jason Cecil filed his Answer. [R.9-16]. 
4. On 8/28/03, a bench trial was held. [R. 82]. 
5. On October 17, 2003, the trial court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and issued its Decree of Divorce. [R. 60-71]. 
6. On November 17, 2003, Jason Cecil filed a Notice of Appeal. [R. 78-79]. 
C. Disposition in the Court Below 
The trial court entered its final judgment. [R. 60-71]. 
D. Relevant Facts 
The parties met while working at Wal-Mart, Inc. in New Mexico. [R. 82 at 26]. 
Jason Cecil (hereinafter "Jason") was an assistant manager and Stephanie Cecil 
(hereinafter "Stephanie") was an assistant manager-in-training. [R. 82 at 26-27]. Jason 
was offered a managerial position in Oregon and Stephanie discovered she was pregnant. 
[R. 82 at 26-27]. The parties were married in Stephanie's hometown in San Juan County 
on February 21, 1998 and then relocated to Oregon. [R. 82 at 26-27]. While in Oregon, 
Jason made his highest wage. [R. 82 at 21]. The parties relocated twice for work and 
each time, they had to borrow money from Jason's parents for the move. [R. 82 at 78, 
72]. 
Jason's managerial position in Oregon did not work out. [R. 82 at 55]. He suffered a 
great deal of stress with this position, to the point where Jason and Stephanie cried 
together over his difficulties. [R. 82 at 74]. They decided to move to Illinois and be near 
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Jason's family. [R. 82 at 30-31, 55]. The relocation resulted in a significant reduction of 
pay. [R. 82 at 55, 87]. 
After returning to Illinois, their martial problems increased. [R. 82 at 75]. Matters 
became difficult for Stephanie because they did not have their own home and she had 
begun working, so they never saw each other. [R. 82 at 75]. When it became apparent 
that they were unable to work out their problems, Jason suggested that they divorce. [R. 
82 at 32]. At that point, Stephanie told Jason that she thought she was pregnant with their 
third (3) child. [R. 82 at 32]. On December 17, 2001, Stephanie moved back to San Juan 
County with the children. [R. 82 at 32]. 
Jason filed for divorce in Illinois and Stephanie received the papers in March 2002. 
[R. 82 at p. 35]. Jason became involved with another woman in January 2002. [R. 82 at 
p. 97]. In February or March 2002, she got pregnant. [R. 82 at 98]. Her pregnancy was 
high risk. [R. 82 at 172]. Their child was born five and one-half (5 Vi) weeks premature. 
[R. 82 at 98]. 
Due to the stress, Jason began taking medication for gastritis and generalized anxiety 
disorder. [R. 82 at 85-86, 101, 145-46]. In December 2002, Jason made the decision to 
step down from his assistant manager position to take a position as a night stocker. [R. 82 
at 150, 176]. Around this same time, he was in a automobile accident. [R. 82 at 171]. 
Stephanie testified that Jason had never before faked an illness and would go to work 
when he was 'sick as a dog.' [R. 82 at 88]. 
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Jason ' s pay was reduced from forty-one thousand five hundred dollars ($41,500.00) 
salary per year to thirty to thirty-five-thousand dollars ($30,000.00™ $35 .000 .00) per year. 
[R. 82 a l l 76], •;;.-' . •-• . - V • •' •• 
As I MI |MI ijn1 I in Jjsnii nuiiin'slcl liiiil llit1 In.il ., ui.il Irvmli Irnni thr sliitiih .', 
guidelines as set forth in Utah Code § 30-3-32 and allow longer periods of time in the 
summer and alternating holidays due to. the distance between the parties, [R. 82 at 2 0 1 -
206] . . Stephanie had allowed six (6) weeks for parent-time in the summer of 2002 [R 
82 til hS | Mir InuM'Mi I H I I M M (I I ,illuv» mn ili'vintion IIMIII llu slalutois guide l ine in 
the summer of 2003 because Jason was behind in child support payments. [R. 82 at 68] . 
As for Jason ' s financial ability to visit, Stephanie acknowledged that Jason 's parents 
picked up and returned the children because Jason could not affoi d it [R. 82 at 84-85] . 
S! i '" on coi lid int. :)t take time 
from Thanksgiving to Christmas. [R. 82 at 31] . 
Whi l e the trial court acknowledged that outside of long vacations, it would be 
virtually impossible for Jason to see the children, it nevertheless ordered that the two (2) 
oldest children \ isit p ei the statutoi > guidelines [R 82 at 2 ] 7 218] - . ' 
Wi th respect to the youngest child, the trial court simply ruled that Stephanie was 
trusted to foster a relationship between Jason and the youngest child, [R. 82 at 218], 
All )] ig 1 lii )se lines, 1 1 ic • G >ui I < )i: cic >i c d tl lat Stephanie make the youngest child available • 
before the two f fder children were piciiM IIoi p;nrnl linn .nicl -iffn lhr\ iTluitinf limn 
their visits. [R. 82 at 218]. 
The trial court ordered that since Jason was " the one that wants time with the 
children" and was more responsible for the twelve hundred (1,200) mile difference 
between the parties, he was ordered to pay all expenses associated with parent-time. [R. 
82 at 218]. 
As to child support, Stephanie asked that Jason pay at the rate he was earning in 
Oregon. [R. 82 at 215]. Jason asked that he pay according to his actual pay. [R. 82 at 
215]. The trial court found that Jason was incapable of working as a manager of Wal-
Mart, Inc. because he was unable to sustain that position without difficulty. [R. 82 at 
216]. The trial court also acknowledged that both parties agreed to step down with 
respect to his income. [R. 82 at 216]. The trial court, however, was not persuaded that 
the best that Jason could do was to be a stocker nor was the court persuaded that Jason 
was mentally or physically incapable of working. [R. 82 at 216]. The court found no 
evidence that he would be unsuccessful working as an assistant-manager of Wal-Mart, 
Inc. [R. 82 at 216]. The trial court found that Jason's choice to be employed as a stocker 
a voluntary decision, that his family should not suffer as a result of this decision and 
imputed his income at the rate he earned as an assistant manager, to wit, forty-one 
thousand five hundred dollars ($41,500.00) a year. [R. 82 at 216]. 
Jason took issue with the fact that Stephanie returned to school. [R. 82 at 198, 210]. 
He pointed out that she had basic job skills, including being an assistant manger-in-
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training at Wal-Mart, Inc. [R. 82 at 210]. Acknowledging that she had basic job skills, 
Stephanie stated that it had always been her dream to go to nursing school. [R. 82 at 
184]. Moreover, Stephanie testified that she did not go to work in another place other 
68]. 
The trial court set Stephanie's income based upon the aid that she was receiving as a 
student at nine hundred dollars ($900.00) per month until 2005. r^ $2 at 221]. 
I he total child si i|: poi I: w as calculated at ele\ en hundred ,.*.;;. •-1ie dollars (S>. • ) 
per month. [R. 82 at 221] . Stephanie 's portion was srt ;i( Iw. thi 
($231.00) per month and Jason ' s portion was set at nine hundred dollars ($900.00) per 
month . [R. 82 at 221] . 
1'* ••; ••-. - .;• liiuu '• • ::us ... . .. J ispai / i \ in income ' ^2 
at 226] . Stephanie was av : • l - l 
a period of thirty-six (36) months . [R. 82 at 226] . Stephanie was also awarded one-half 
of the interest in the profit-sharing plan, acquired during marriage, or seven thousand five 
I "liilircil ilollit's ($ ' ">iMi mi i |R '-: ' JII " >n| ll.n-
 111 ui v\;is o n l ' i a l In hear the cost of • 
prepar ing the qualified. domestic relations order in addition to pa> ing Stephanie" s 
a t torney 's fees in the amount of two thousand dollars ($2,000.00). [R. 82 at 230] . 
S U M M A R Y O F A R G U M E N T 
I lit1 IIKII nintfl IIIHI1 "ill nil discretion when mil l.ulnl l< I.islii HI ,I |MIcnl - t io ie plan that 
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took into account the best interests of the children. It, likewise, failed to take into account 
the difficulty that the noncustodial parent would have visiting his children, his inability to 
visit his youngest child, his lack of financial resources and his work schedule. Imposing 
the statutory guidelines resulted in the two (2) oldest children having limited contact 
during the summer and almost no parent-time during the holidays. Finally, it afforded 
Jason no realistic hope of fostering a relationship with his youngest child, since parent-
time was to take place before and after the visits with the oldest children and it was 
Jason's parents who would be picking up and returning the children. 
The trial court, abused its discretion when it imputed Jason's income. It failed to take 
into consideration his circumstances when it concluded that Jason was voluntarily 
underemployed. 
Third, the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded Stephanie alimony. 
Stephanie had basic job skills and her decision to pursue a nursing degree did not justify 
the reduction in her pay nor the requirement that Jason pay alimony due to the disparity in 
their income.. 
Finally, given the fact that Stephanie was awarded seven thousand five hundred 
dollars ($7,500.00) from the pension plan, she failed to show that she did not have the 
ability to pay her attorneys' fees. Additionally, for reasons set forth regarding the error in 
imputing Jason's income, he did not have the ability to pay her attorneys' fees. 
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ARG [ ] MEN I1 
Point 1: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
IMPOSED THE STATUTORY GUIDELINES AND HELD JASON 
RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH PARENT-
TIME. 
J ; • • ^lephanie lives in ( Jtah, a distanc e of approximately one 
thousand two hundred miles (1. 200) [R 82 at 30 32] Based on this significant distance 
between the parties, Jason requested a deviation from the statutory guidelines. [R. 82 at 
201-206]. Jason also noted that Stephanie had allowed such deviation the previous 
summer, hi! insisted \m the slatuli •> • guidelines because Jason was behind on child
 : 
s :. something that shoi ilci no 1 N • i111 I»i U • i n 11111»i1 n s i< I r r ; 111 o n [ R S 1 ,11 < ! 11 
The trial court declined to deviate from the statutory schedule and allow longer 
summer and alternating holidays. [R. 82 at 217-218] Noting that Jason was responsible 
foi the distance bet\ v een them and noting that It w as J ason who w anted to see the 
That decision essentially punished Jason and it is inconsistent with the statutes 
governing parent-time. 
Utah Code § 30 3 34 p i c • »- ides as folio \ vs: : ' 
{ 1 ) If the parties are unable to agree on a parent-time 
schedule, the court may establish a parent-time schedule 
consistent with the best interests of the child. 
(2) The advisory guidelines as provided in Section 30-3-33 
and the parent-time schedule as provided in Sections 30-3-35 
and 30-3-35.5 shall be presumed to be in the best Interests of 
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the child. The parent-time schedule shall be considered the 
minimum parent-time to which the noncustodial parent and 
the child shall be entitled unless a parent can establish 
otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence that more or 
less parent-time should be awarded based upon any of the 
following criteria: 
(b) the distance between the residency of the child and the 
noncustodial parent. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Not only does the statute require that the distance be taken into account, but it requires 
that the parent-time schedule be in the child's best interest and allow both parents an 
active role in parenting. 
(2)(a) it is in the best interests of the child of divorcing, 
divorced, or adjudicated parents to have frequent, meaningful, 
and continuing access to each parent following separation or divorce; 
(b) each divorcing, separating, or adjudicated parent is 
entitled to and responsible for frequent, meaningful, and 
continuing access with his child consistent with the child's 
best interests; and 
(c) it is in the best interests of the child to have both parents 
actively involved in parenting the child. 
Utah Code § 30-3-32. Here, the trial court was well aware of the difficulty that Jason had 
with exercising parent-time. In fact, the trial court noted that "outside of long vacations, it 
would be virtually impossible" for Jason to see the children. [R. 82 at 217-218]. Yet, 
instead of considering means that would allow Jason access to the children, the trial court 
imposed the statutory guidelines. Such a schedule failed to allow frequent, meaningful 
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and continuing access between Jason and the children. It, likewise, disregarded the 
children's best interests to have frequent, meaningful and continuing access to both 
parents as well as have both parents actively involved in parenting. 
This is especially true with respect to the relationship between Zack and his father. 
The trial court stated that Jason would be able to see Zack only when the older two (2) 
children were picked up and returned even though Stephanie testified that Jason's 
parent's picked up and returned the children because of Jason's lack of financial 
resources. [R. 82 at 218, 31]. She also testified that Jason, as a Wal-Mart, Inc. employee, 
would be unable to take time off between Thanksgiving and Christmas. [R. 82 at 31]. 
By ignoring Jason's work schedule and the expense that he would have to bear to 
exercise parent time, the trial court's ruling also ran afoul of the advisory guidelines: 
In addition to the parent-time schedules provided in Sections 
30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5, advisory guidelines are suggested to 
govern all parent-time arrangements between parents. These 
advisory guidelines include: 
(6) the court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule 
to reasonably accommodate the work schedule of both parents 
and may increase the parent-time allowed to the noncustodial 
parent but shall not diminish the standardized parent-time 
provided in Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5; 
(7) the court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule 
to reasonably accommodate the distance between the parties 
and the expense of exercising parent-time: 
Utah Code § 30-3-33 (emphasis added). 
Here, the court required Jason to bear all the expense. It refused to reasonably 
11 
allocate the expense of exercising parent-time. 
In sum, the trial court's decision to impose the statutory guidelines and require Jason, 
the noncustodial parent, to bear all expenses because he is the one that is at most fault for 
the distance between the parties and because uhe is the one that wants time with the 
children" not only runs afoul of the statutes set forth above, but is clearly against public 
policy. [R. 82 at 218]. Parent-time cannot be used in a manner to either deny access to a 
parent or to punish a parent. The parent that wants to see his or her children should not be 
the one that has to bear all the financial costs of parent-time. Yet, this is precisely what 
the trial court ordered. 
Point 2: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
FOUND JASON TO BE VOLUNTARILY UNDEREMPLOYED AND 
IMPUTED HIS INCOME 
It is well established that a trial court has the authority to impute income if it finds that 
a parent is voluntarily underemployed.2 See also. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1024 
2Utah Code 78-45-7.5 provides in, relevant part, that: 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine 
whether an underemployment or overemployment situation exists. 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the 
parent stipulates to the amount imputed, the party defaults, or, 
in contested cases, a hearing is held and a finding made that 
the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based 
upon employment potential and probable earnings as derived 
from work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing 
12 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). In doing so, the trial court must look at the circumstances of a 
parent in order to determine whether that parent is voluntarily underemployed to avoid a 
child support obligation. 
Here, the trial court looked at Jason's historical income. [R. 82 at 216]. As to Jason's 
explanation as to why he quit as an assistant manager, the trial court simply stated that it 
was not convinced that Jason's mental and physical condition prevented him from 
working in the position as an assistant manager. [R. 82 at 216]. The trial court concluded 
that Jason was voluntarily underemployed and imputed his income based on his historical 
earnings as an assistant manager or forty-one thousand five hundred dollars ($41,500.00) 
per year. [R. 82 at 216]. In doing so, the trial court abused its discretion. 
In Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), the appellate court addressed this 
very issue. There, the father quit his job which paid twenty-four hundred dollars 
($2,400.00) per month, returned to school and got a job paying six dollars and ninety 
cents ($6.90) per hour. As a result of his decision, his family had to go on welfare. Id., 
869 P.2d at 965. At trial, Mr. Hill conceded that income imputation was appropriate, 
however, disagreed on the amount. Id. 
The circumstances of the instant case stands in sharp contrast to the circumstances in 
earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the 
community, or the median earning for persons in the same 
occupation in the same geographical area as found in the 
statistics maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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Hill Unlike Mr. Hill, Jason did not simply decide to return to school and take a lower 
paying job. Nor did he concede that imputation was appropriate. 
In March of 1998, Jason married Stephanie, who was pregnant and relocated to 
Oregon. [R. 82 at 26-27]. While in Oregon, the family moved twice. [R. 82 at 78]. 
Although Jason was at his highest wage while in Oregon, he still had to borrow money 
from his parents to help with the moves. [R. 82 at 72]. 
Almost immediately, Jason experienced a great deal of stress in his new position as a 
co-manager. [R. 82 at 55]. Stephanie acknowledged this when she testified that Jason and 
she cried together. [R. 82 at 74]. Three years later, they decided to move to Illinois to be 
close to his family (August 2001). [R. 82 at 30-31, 55]. As a result of this decision, they 
took a significant reduction in pay. [R. 82 at 55, 87]. 
When they arrived in Illinois, the family moved in with Jason's parents. [R. 82 at 75]. 
Both worked in effort to be able to move into their own home. [R. 82 at 75]. As a result 
of working in different areas, Jason and Stephanie hardly saw each other. [R. 82 at 75]. 
Their marital problems increased. [R. 82 at 75]. At one point, Jason suggested that they 
divorce, only to find out that Stephanie was pregnant. [R. 82 at 32]. Eventually, 
Stephanie moved from Illinois with the children. [R. 82 at 32]. 
After their breakup, Jason filed for divorce in Illinois. [R. 82 at 35]. He also became 
involved with another woman. [R. 82 at 97]., She became pregnant and due to 
difficulties, almost lost their child. [R. 82 at 172]. Their daughter was born five and one-
14 
half weeks (5 Vi) premature. [R. 82 at 98]. Jason then was in a car accident. [R. 82 at 
171]. 
Looking at the stressors over a this period, it is certainly apparent that Jason was not 
doing well. As a result, Jason began taking medication for gastritis and generalized 
anxiety. [R. 82 at 85-86, 101, 145-146]. He also made the decision not to continue 
working as an assistant manager and became a night stocker. [R. 82 at 150, 176]. 
There is no question but that parents have an obligation to support their children to the 
best of their abilities. Jason has done that. He never quit working, rather he made the 
choice to work in a less demanding and stressful position. 
Given Jason's circumstances, the trial court erred when it disregarded his present 
ability to generate income. Jason's emotional and physical condition underscores that he 
is not simply disregarding his familial obligations. Indeed, Stephanie testified that he 
would often work when he was as 'sick as a dog' and he was not a malinger. [R. 82 at 
88]. There was no testimony that his decision to step down was due to malingering. In 
fact, there is no indication that Jason acted in bad faith with respect to taking a lower 
paying position. His explanation and justification for this reduction was reasonable. 
Point 3: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
AWARDED STEPHANIE ALIMONY, 
When awarding alimony, the trial court must consider the "financial condition and 
needs of the recipient spouse." Utah Code §30-3-5(8)(a)(l). 
In the case at hand, the trial court looked at Stephanie's needs without questioning her 
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financial condition and needs3. Jason took issue with the alimony on that basis4. 
As to her financial condition, Stephanie's income was low because of her decision to 
go to nursing school. She stated that it had been her dream to go to nursing school. [R. 
82 at 184]. However, Stephanie had basic job skills and had worked at Wal-Mart, Inc. 
as an assistant manager-in-training. [R. 82 at 210]. 
In Mancil v. Smith 18 P3d 509 (Utah Ct. App. 2000), the appellate court rejected a 
parent's decision to return to school where it was schooling beyond basic job skills. In so 
holding, the court reasoned: 
Our conclusion is fully consistent with the policy underlying 
Utah's child support laws, which are designed to maximize 
support to children from both parents. See Utah Code Ann. § 
78-45-3(1) (Supp. 2000) ("Every father shall support his 
child[.]"); id. § 78-45-4(1) ("Every woman shall support her 
child[.]lf). "Utah's clear policy is to require both parents to 
support their child to the extent that each is financially able." 
Department of Human Servs. ex rel. Parker v. Irizarry, 945 
P.2d 676, 683 (Utah 1997) (Zimmerman, C.J., dissenting). To 
allow a parent to disregard this duty over the course of a four-
year college education would run counter to this policy. A 
child's right to ongoing support should not be held hostage to 
a parent's desire to get a higher education, even if the parent's 
degree will eventually allow the parent to pay support at a 
higher level. n2 
3The trial court also noted the disparity in the parties' income. Utah Code § 30-3-
5(8)( "The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' 
respective standards of living."). 
4For the reasons set forth in the section addressing the imputed income, Jason also 
objected on the basis that he larked the, ability to pay alimnnjf 
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Footnotes 
n2 For better or worse, one's income level and resulting ability 
to pay child support are not necessarily enhanced by a college 
education. A good car salesman with a high school diploma 
may well earn more than an elementary school teacher with a 
bachelor's degree. 
Mancil, 18 P.3d at §16, fn. 2. 
Here, Stephanie decision to go to nursing school, when she already possessed basic 
job skills was unreasonable under Mancil. 
Thus, the trial court erred by failing to consider Stephanie's earning capacity. Rehn v. 
Rehn, §9, 974 P2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). The court, however, merely referenced her 
monthly income and did not take into account earning capacity. Rehn at §9 (citing 
Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)). 
The trial court also erred when it failed to enter any findings as to the reasonableness 
of her needs. Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P2d 877, 880 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)(Findings 
required. Moreover, "failure to consider these factors constitutes an abuse of discretion" 
[Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958-59 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)] resulting in reversal 
"unless pertinent facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting 
only a finding in favor of the judgment. Rehn 974 P.2d at 310 quoting Stevens. 
Here, the only pertinent facts regarding Stephanie's need for alimony was her reduced 
income due to her decision to return to school. No findings were entered with respect to 
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the actual need. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion. 
Point 4: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
AWARDED ATTORNEYS' FEES TO STEPHANIE. 
The law governing alimony is Utah Code § 30-3-5(8) which provides, in relevant part, 
that: 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors 
in determining alimony: 
(I) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
Here, the trial court simply accepted Stephanie's financial condition and needs 
without questioning her earning capacity or ability to produce income. It, likewise, 
disregarded the fact that Stephanie would receive seven thousand five hundred dollars 
($7,500.00) as her part of the interest that accrued in the parties' pension plan during 
marriage. [R. 82 at 220]. 
Even without imputing her income, Stephanie had the ability to pay her own 
attorneys' fees from the award of seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500.00) from 
the pension plan. 
For reasons set forth above in Point 2 (which address the imputation of Jason's 
income), the trial court erred in finding that Jason had the ability to pay Stephanie's 
attorneys' fees. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the trial court's decision regarding 
parent-time, child support, the award of alimony and attorneys' fees. 
DATED this day of>fcry 2004. 
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Utah Code § 30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health care of 
parties and children — Division of debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — 
Custody and parent-time — Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for 
modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include 
the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical 
and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the 
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for 
the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5 
(1) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, 
obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the 
court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, 
current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, 
Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning 
financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If 
the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent 
children would be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial 
parent to provide child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for 
the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for 
distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the 
mother and father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modification. 
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of pairents and visitation rights of grandparents 
and other members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of 
the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the 
court may include in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a 
provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered 
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parent-time or visitation schedule entered under this chapter. 
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court 
order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable 
attorneys1 fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that 
the petition was without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(7) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or 
a visitation order by a grandparent or other member of the immediate family pursuant to 
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation or parent-time right has been previously granted by 
the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees 
and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the other party's failure to 
provide or exercise court-ordered visitation or parent-time. 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(I) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor 
spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor 
spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor 
spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time 
of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the 
court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, 
base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of 
short duration, when no children have been conceived or bom during the marriage, the 
court may consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' 
respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the 
income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be 
considered in dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If 
one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both 
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing 
the marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children 
have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each 
party to the condition which existed at the time of the marriage. 
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(g) (I) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders 
regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not 
foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs 
of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may not 
be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8). 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the 
payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the 
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that 
a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or 
death of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void 
ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to 
the action of annulment and his rights are determined. 
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon 
establishment by the party paying alimony thatt the former spouse is cohabitating with 
another person. 
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Utah Code § 30-3-32. Parent-time - Intent - Policy - Definitions 
(1) It is the intent of the Legislature to promote parent-time at a level consistent with all 
parties' interests. 
(2) Absent a showing by a preponderance of evidence of real harm or substantiated 
potential harm to the child: 
(a) it is in the best interests of the child of divorcing, divorced, or adjudicated parents to 
have frequent, meaningful, and continuing access to each parent following separation or divorce; 
(b) each divorcing, separating, or adjudicated parent is entitled to and responsible for 
frequent, meaningful, and continuing access with his child consistent with the child's best 
interests; and 
(c) it is in the best interests of the child to have both parents actively involved in 
parenting the child. 
(3) For purposes of Sections 30-3-32 through 30-3-37: 
(a) "Child" means the child or children of divorcing, separating, or adjudicated parents. 
(b) "Christmas school vacation" means the time period beginning on the evening the child 
gets out of school for the Christmas or winter school break until the evening before the 
child returns to school, except for Christmas Eve and Christmas Day. 
(c) "Extended parent-time" means a period of parent-time other than a weekend, holiday 
as provided in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(f) and (2)(g), religious holidays as provided in 
Subsections 30-3-33(3) and (15), and "Christmas school vacation." 
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Utah Code § 30-3-33. Advisory guidelines 
In addition to the parent-time schedules provided in Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5, 
advisory guidelines are suggested to govern all parent-time arrangements between 
parents. These advisory guidelines include: 
(1) parent-time schedules mutually agreed upon by both parents are preferable to a court-
imposed solution; 
(2) the parent-time schedule shall be utilized to maximize the continuity and stability of 
the child's life; 
(3) special consideration shall be given by each parent to make the child available to 
attend family functions including funerals, weddings, family reunions, religious holidays, 
important ceremonies, and other significant events in the life of the child or in the life of 
either parent which may inadvertently conflict with the parent-time schedule; 
(4) the noncustodial parent shall pick up the child at the times specified and return the 
child at the times specified, and the child's regular school hours shall not be interrupted; 
(5) the custodial parent shall have the child ready for parent-time at the time he is to be 
picked up and shall be present at the custodial home or shall make reasonable alternate 
arrangements to receive the child at the time he is returned; 
(6) the court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule to reasonably 
accommodate the work schedule of both parents and may increase the parent-time 
allowed to the noncustodial parent but shall not diminish the standardized parent-time 
provided in Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5; 
(7) the court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule to reasonably 
accommodate the distance between the parties and the expense of exercising parent-time; 
(8) neither parent-time nor child support is to be withheld due to either parent's failure to 
comply with a court-ordered parent-time schedule; 
(9) the custodial parent shall notify the noncustodial parent within 24 hours of receiving 
notice of all significant school, social, sports, and community functions in which the child 
is participating or being honored, and the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to attend 
and participate fully; 
(10) the noncustodial parent shall have access directly to all school reports including 
preschool and daycare reports and medical records and shall be notified immediately by 
the custodial parent in the event of a medical emergency; 
(11) each parent shall provide the other with his current address and telephone number 
within 24 hours of any change; 
(12) each parent shall permit and encourage liberal telephone contact during reasonable 
hours and uncensored mail privileges with the child; 
(13) parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than surrogate care and 
the court shall encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing the noncustodial parent, if 
willing and able, to provide child care; 
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(14) each parent shall provide all surrogate care providers with the name, current address, 
and telephone number of the other parent and shall provide the noncustodial parent with 
the name, current address, and telephone number of all surrogate care providers unless the 
court for good cause orders otherwise; and 
(15) each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major religious holidays 
celebrated by the parents, and the parent who celebrates a religious holiday that the other 
parent does not celebrate shall have the right to be together with the child on the religious holiday. 
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Utah Code § 30-3-34. Best interests - Rebuttable presumption 
(1) If the parties are unable to agree on a parent-time schedule, the court may establish a 
parent-time schedule consistent with the best interests of the child. 
(2) The advisory guidelines as provided in Section 30-3-33 and the parent-time schedule 
as provided in Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5 shall be presumed to be in the best 
interests of the child. The parent-time schedule shall be considered the minimum parent-
time to which the noncustodial parent and the child shall be entitled unless a parent can 
establish otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence that more or less parent-time 
should be awarded based upon any of the following criteria: 
(a) parent-time would endanger the child's physical health or significantly impair the 
child's emotional development; 
(b) the distance between the residency of the child and the noncustodial parent; 
(c) a substantiated or unfounded allegation of child abuse has been made; 
(d) the lack of demonstrated parenting skills without safeguards to ensure the child's well-
being during parent-time; 
(e) the financial inability of the noncustodial parent to provide adequate food and shelter 
for the child during periods of parent-time; 
(f) the preference of the child if the court determines the child to be of sufficient maturity; 
(g) the incarceration of the noncustodial parent in a county jail, secure youth corrections 
facility, or an adult corrections facility; 
(h) shared interests between the child and the noncustodial parent; 
(I) the involvement of the noncustodial parent in the school, community, religious, or 
other related activities of the child; 
(j) the availability of the noncustodial parent to care for the child when the custodial 
parent is unavailable to do so because of work or other circumstances; 
(k) a substantial and chronic pattern of missing, canceling, or denying regularly scheduled 
parent-time; 
(1) the minimal duration of and lack of significant bonding in the parents' relationship 
prior to the conception of the child; 
(m) the parent-time schedule of siblings; 
(n) the lack of reasonable alternatives to the needs of a nursing child; and 
(o) any other criteria the court determines relevant to the best interests of the child. 
(3) The court shall enter the reasons underlying its order for parent-time that: 
(a) incorporates a parent-time schedule provided in Section 30-3-35 or 30-3-35.5; or 
(b) provides more or less parent-time than a parent-time schedule provided in Section 30-
3-35 or 30-3-35.5. 
(4) Once the parent-time schedule has been established, the parties may not alter the 
schedule except by mutual consent of the parties or a court order. 
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Utah Code § 30-3-35. Minimum schedule for parent-time for children 5 to 18 years 
of age 
(1) The parent-time schedule in this section applies to children 5 to 18 years of age. 
(2) If the parties do not agree to a parent-time schedule, the following schedule shall be 
considered the minimum parent-time to which the noncustodial parent and the child shall 
be entitled: 
(a) (I) one weekday evening to be specified by the noncustodial parent or the court from 
5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m.; or 
(ii) at the election of the noncustodial parent, one weekday from the time the child!s 
school is regularly dismissed until 8:30 p.m., unless the court directs the application of 
Subsection (2)(a)(I); 
(b) (I) alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree 
from 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year; or 
(ii) at the election of the noncustodial parent, from the time the child's school is regularly 
dismissed on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday, unless the court directs the application of 
Subsection (2)(b)(I); 
(c) holidays take precedence over the weekend parent-time, and changes shall not be 
made to the regular rotation of the alternating weekend parent-time schedule; 
(d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the noncustodial parent shall be 
responsible for the child's attendance at school for that school day; 
(e) (I) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the total holiday 
period extends beyond that time so that the child is free from school and the parent is free 
from work, the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to this lengthier holiday period; or 
(ii) at the election of the noncustodial parent, parent-time over a scheduled holiday 
weekend may begin from the time the child's school is regularly dismissed at the 
beginning of the holiday weekend until 7 p.m. on the last day of the holiday weekend; 
(f) in years ending in an odd number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays: 
(I) child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 
9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for 
the birthday; 
(ii) Martin Luther King, Jr. beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the 
holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is 
completely entitled; 
(iii) spring break or Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on the day school lets out for the 
holiday until 7 p.m. on the Sunday before school resumes; 
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday 
extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the 
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holiday; and 
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-
32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1 p.m., so long as the entire holiday 
is equally divided; 
(g) in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays: 
(I) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of 
the noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) Washington and Lincoln Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Monday 
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent 
is completely entitled; 
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iv) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday 
extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(v) the fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as U.E.A. weekend beginning at 
6 p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier 
period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until Sunday at 7 p.m; and 
(viii) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation, including New Year's Day, as 
defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. until 9 p.m., 
so long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided; 
(h) the custodial parent is entitled to the odd year holidays in even years and the even year 
holidays in odd years; 
(I) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive father every year beginning at 
9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(j) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive mother every year beginning 
at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(k) extended parent-time with the noncustodial parent may be: 
(I) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial parent; 
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent; and 
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to parent-time for the custodial parent 
consistent with these guidelines; 
(1) the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period of uninterrupted time 
during the children's summer vacation from school for purposes of vacation; 
(m) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial parent's extended 
parent-time shall be 14 of the vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided the 
custodial parent has holiday and phone visits; 
(n) notification of extended parent-time or vacation weeks with the child shall be 
provided at least 30 days in advance to the other parent; and 
(o) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours and for reasonable duration. 
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(3) Any elections required to be made in accordance with this section by either parent 
concerning parent-time shall be made a part of the decree and made a part of the parent-
time order. 
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Utah Code § 30-3-37. Relocation 
(1) When either parent decides to move from the state of Utah or 150 miles or more from 
the residence specified in the couifs decree, that parent shall provide if possible 60 days 
advance written notice of the intended relocation to the other parent. The written notice of 
relocation shall contain statements affirming the following: 
(a) the parent-time provisions in Subsection (5) or a schedule approved by both parties 
will be followed; and 
(b) neither parent will interfere with the other's parental rights pursuant to court ordered 
parent-time arrangements, or the schedule approved by both parties. 
(2) The court may, upon motion of any party or upon the court's own motion, schedule a 
hearing with notice to review the notice of relocation and parent-time schedule as 
provided in Section 30-3-35 and make appropriate orders regarding the parent-time and 
costs for parent-time transportation. 
(3) In determining the parent-time schedule and allocating the transportation costs, the 
court shall consider: 
(a) the reason for the parent's relocation; 
(b) the additional costs or difficulty to both parents in exercising parent-time; 
(c) the economic resources of both parents; and 
(d) other factors the court considers necessary and relevant. 
(4) Upon the motion of any party, the court maiy order the parent intending to move to pay 
the costs of transportation for: 
(a) at least one visit per year with the other parent; and 
(b) any number of additional visits as determined equitable by the court. 
(5) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, upon the relocation of one of the parties the 
following schedule shall be the minimum requirements for parent-time with a school-age child: 
(a) in years ending in an odd number, the child shall spend the following holidays with 
the noncustodial parent: 
(I) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday until Sunday; and 
(ii) the fall school break, if applicable, beginning the last day of school before the holiday 
until the day before school resumes; 
(b) in years ending in an even number, the child shall spend the following holidays with 
the noncustodial parent: 
(I) the entire winter school break period; and 
(ii) Spring break beginning the last day of school before the holiday until the day before 
school resumes; and 
(c) extended parent-time equal to Vi of the summer or off-track time for consecutive 
weeks. The week before school begins may not be counted as part of the summer period. 
(6) Upon the motion of any party, the court maiy order uninterrupted parent-time with the 
noncustodial parent for a minimum of 30 days during extended parent-time, unless the 
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court finds it is not in the best interests of the child. If the court orders uninterrupted 
parent-time during a period not covered by this section, it shall specify in its order which 
parent is responsible for the child's travel expenses. 
(7) Unless otherwise ordered by the court the relocating party shall be responsible for all 
the child's travel expenses relating to Subsections (5)(a) and (b) and lA of the child's travel 
expenses relating to Subsection (5)(c), provided the noncustodial party is current on all 
support obligations. If the noncustodial party has been found in contempt for not being 
current on all support obligations, he shall be responsible for all of the child's travel 
expenses under Subsection (5), unless the court rules otherwise. Reimbursement by either 
responsible party to the other for the child's travel expenses shall be made within 30 days 
of receipt of documents detailing those expenses. 
(8) The court may apply this provision to any preexisting decree of divorce. 
(9) Any action under this section may be set for an expedited hearing. 
(10) A parent who fails to comply with the notice of relocation in Subsection (1) shall be 
in contempt of the court's order. 
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Utah Code § 78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed income 
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, including noneamed sources, except under 
Subsection (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from 
anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, alimony from 
previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, social security benefits, workers' 
compensation benefits, unemployment compensation, income replacement disability 
insurance benefits, and payments from "nonmeans-tested" government programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one full-time 40-
hour job. However, if and only if during the time prior to the original support order, the 
parent normally and consistently worked more than 40 hours at his job, the court may 
consider this extra time as a pattern in calculating the parent's ability to provide child support. 
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income aire: 
(a) cash assistance provided under Title 3 5A, Chapter 3, Part 3, Family Employment Program; 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training Partnership Act, 
Supplemental Security Income, Social Security Disability Insurance, Medicaid, Food 
Stamps, or General Assistance; and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent. 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall be calculated 
by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operation 
from gross receipts. The income and expenses from self-employment or operation of a 
business shall be reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross income available to 
the parent to satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the 
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the amount of 
business income determined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual basis and then 
recalculated to determine the average gross monthly income. 
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each parent shall provide 
year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and complete copies of tax returns from at 
least the most recent year unless the court finds the verification is not reasonably 
available. Verification of income from records maintained by the Department of 
Workforce Services may be substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income 
tax returns. 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether an 
underemployment or overemployment situation exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection (7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount 
34 
imputed, the party defaults, or, in contested cases, a hearing is held and a finding made 
that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment 
potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, 
and prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the community, or the 
median earning for persons in the same occupation in the same geographical area as 
found in the statistics maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history or their occupation is unknown, income shall be 
imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a 
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an 
administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis 
for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist: 
(I) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children approach or equal the 
amount of income the custodial parent can earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he cannot earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the custodial parent's presence 
in the home. 
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a minor child who is the subject of a 
child support award nor benefits to a minor child in the child's own right such as 
Supplemental Security Income. 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a parent shall be 
credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning record it is based, by crediting 
the amount against the potential obligation of that parent. Other unearned income of a 
child may be considered as income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case. 
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also think that she ought to have those and he can buy them. 
THE COURT: Well I think the case law is I cannot 
require her to sign any of those other, unless is he current. 
MZ. REILLY: Current. 
MR. HALLS: Well, and heTs yet to be current. 
MZ. REILLY: That's only on child support, Your 
Honor. 
MR. HALLS: Well, okay. Call it whatever. He's yet 
to be current. She didn't need to do that. She did it. 
That's all I have, Your Honor. 
COURT ORDER AND FINDINGS 
THE COURT: Okay. In — in setting, ah, child 
support and determining, ah, the appropriateness of alimony, I 
need to decide what his income is or would be, if he were 
fully employed, if I think he's purposely intentionally 
underemployed. 
Ah, we have some significant extremes here for 
someone that's avoided a regular job. Ah, hefs advocating, 
ah, $2,600 on the low end and she's advocating — $2,600 a 
month on the low end, and she's advocating, on the high end, 
50 — close to $5,500 a month. Urn, the high end represents a 
time when he was employed in an area of the United States 
where there's a 15% premium for cost of living, ah, in Oregon, 
and it was ^Isn rprpi v-ing a bonus. And he was paid ac a 
Manager for Wal-Mart store. Ah, but he never had employment 
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as a Manager of a Wal-Mart store that was — that was free of 
serious difficulty. I — I'm not persuaded that in the long 
run he would — he would have been or can be, in the future, 
successful as a Wal-Mart Manager. Now thatfs gonna be decided 
by him by other people than me. But I have one instance where 
he's a Wal-Mart Manager and he was in conflict with his — 
with his boss, ah, and it was bad enough that the two of them 
mutually agreed that it was good to look for another job, even 
if it meant stepping down a step on the corporate ladder. 
Ah, on the other hand, on the low end I'm not 
persuaded that the best he can do, ah, is what he's doing now. 
Ah, I've heard no evidence that he was ever unsuccessful as an 
Assistant Manager. I'm not persuaded that it was medically 
physically necessary for his health that he not work as an 
Assistant Manager, and he says the stress as an Assistant 
Manager is less than as a Manager. So I believe he could be 
employed as an Assistant Manager and that not being thus 
employed is a volunteer decision on his part, which his family 
should not suffer for, ah, particularly those members of his 
family who aren't getting any of the benefit from the reduced 
stress. So, urn, I'm going to set his, ah, salary at $41,500, 
which is the best evidence I have of his income as an 
Assistant Manager. 
Nuw the next question was the value of the van, ah, 
as opposed to the debt on the van. Ah, it's hard for me to 
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1 ignore what I — what I know. And I think this is common 
2 knowledge, ah, about the car and the used car market and, ah, 
3 I just cannot believe that a 2001 Dodge Caravan is worth 
4 $24,000. Ah, I believe that it's worth about $14,000. And my 
5 best evidence of the debt on it is that it's $24,000. That 
6 11 difference is $10,000 and that's the result of the choices the 
7 two of them jointly made about what cars they would buy and 
8 what cars they would use and when they'd sell 'em and when 
9 they'd buy new ones. It's unfortunate, but not uncommon for 
10 people to get upside down on their vehicles. So that's going 
11 to be $10,000 of marital debt. 
12 The parental debt, the debt to his parents is not 
13 11 evidenced by any writing, nor by any evidence of an explicit 
L4 agreement, ah, by both parties to the marriage to repay that 
L5 amount. Ah, I'm not persuaded that it is therefore a legally 
L6 enforceable bona fide debt of the marriage and I'm going to 
L7 || ignore any obligation thereon, ah, as a marital obligation, 
L8 || except that if there is any responsibility there, ah, it will 
.9 be paid by him. 
10 || Urn, there hasn't been much testimony about any 
!1 alternative custody arrangement than — than sole custody for 
!2 her, and that's clearly what's appropriate here. 
'3 As far as parent time is concerned, urn, the 
4 circumstances are such that — that — that outside of long 
5 vacations, it's going to be virtually impossible for him to 
see the children in person, ah, so Ifm — Ifm going to, ah, 
set that at the minimum visitation schedule for children 5 to 
18 for both of the older children, even -chough one of them is 
not yet four. I think the fact that the two of them can go 
together is going to ameliorate the concerns I might have 
about a four-year-old or a three-year-old. 
Ah, any expenses that result from the great distance 
between the two of them will be born by him. Ah, he's the one 
that wants the time with the children. Ah, I think he is the 
one of the two that is more responsible for the fact that 
these children now have two parents who are separated by 
1,200-1,300 miles of road. 
Ah, with respect to Zack, ah, Ifm going to trust 
mother to, ah, foster a relationship with the — between the 
child and the father. Urn, I — I am going to require that she 
make Zack available to visit with his father before he, ah — 
before the father picks up the other children and after the 
father brings the other children back. That sounds like 
something that makes sense. Ifm going to le^ve it to your 
good judgment when Zack is familiar enough with his father 
that he would be able to also make the trip with them for 
these extended visits, ah, and may involve some familiarity 
with the people who are going to transport him. The time will 
come when he wants to go, and that's about the time you- should 
let him. 
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don't know what I can do, except assume that it's, ah — well 
of course, assuming that it's zero is — is, ah, to his 
advantage. Okay. 
You don't have any documentation about that either, 
do you? 
MZ. REILLY: No. 
THE COURT: He'd come on the stand and his testimony 
would be the only thing we'd have. 
MZ. REILLY: That he brings home — that she brings 
home $300 every two weeks. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MZ. REILLY: But is the Court going to wait for, 
ah — for ORS to get involved? Because ORS could certainly do 
this, if they were supposed to intervene. 
MR. HALLS: Your Honor, she didn't actually go get 
any kind of support until June, so it's only been, what? 
THE COURT: Okay. Well I don't think I can reduce 
it for children in his present home. I don't have the 
evidence I need to do that. So he's — she's gonna have $900 
a month from her work and, ah, it's presumed that she's 
providing $231 of support to her children, leaving her 
$669 for her other needs. 
Urn, I've got him at, ah, about $3,450 per month, 
paying $900 of child support, leaving him with $2,550 for his 
other needs. Urn, it's still pretty stark contrast between the 
two of them. I'm going to require that he pay, ah — you 
know, the difficult thing about all of these calculations is 
as soon as he's paying her, she's not gonna get her TANF. Her 
TANF's going away. She's not really getting — I can't really 
count on her continuing to receive TANF. Ah — 
MR. HALLS: It's why we did the two sheets. We did 
the second sheet that basically shows that when he starts 
paying, she loses — she gets about $161 in — 
THE COURT: And if she doesn't loose it, they're 
gonna collect it from him and she's not gonna see it anyway. 
Well see, I'd — I'd have him paying her another $900 in 
alimony, if I was strictly equalizing their income, spreading 
the misery out between the two of them because there's no way 
that the two — these two people can enjoy the same lifestyle 
they enjoyed when they were together and, ah, he was a Manager 
of a Wal-Mart in Oregon. 
Well I'm gonna require that he pay, ah, alimony of, 
ah, $500 a month till, ah — for three years. 
MZ. REILLY: Until when, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: For three years. 
MR. HALLS: 36 months. 
THE COURT: I'm going to require that he does pay 
the arrearages on child support and alimony and — 
MR. HALLS: $6,700, less fhp — Hn they nood to ohow 
us that something — what do we do about the — 
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